February/March Programme (Updated)

The following is the Society's programme for the coming weeks:

Wednesday 13th February, 5pm - Taylor C11
'Minority Report' and Discussion
(moderated by Alessia Vacca and Ahmed Hassanein)

Please click here for further information.

Wednesday 20th February, 5pm - Taylor C28
Justin Borg Barthet, 'The Challenge of Online Gambling to European Socio-Economic Governance'

Abstract:
In Schindler the ECJ held that lotteries fall within the meaning of the freedom to provide services for the purposes of the EC Treaty, provided that Member States may derogate from the Treaty in order to protect public order and the interests of consumers. The judgment leaves much room for interpretation regarding the extent to which Member States may erect barriers to online gambling within the EC. In the absence of European legislation to clarify the limits of Member States’ powers, it is submitted that a lack of clarity gives rise to ample grounds for costly litigation. In addition, the law as it stands challenges the notion of shared sovereignty in the EC. Prescriptive jurisdiction is haphazardly distributed among the Member States, rather than being pooled supranationally. Moreover, the rules governing adjudicatory jurisdiction allow ample room for forum shopping. The presentation analyses these issues with reference to the litigation in PMU v Zeturf in which the courts of two EU Member States had to contend with questions of the freedom to provide services, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments, and the conflict between the public policies of Member States.

Wednesday 12th March, 5pm - Taylor C16
Brigit Toebes, 'Sex Selection Under International Human Rights Law'

Abstract:
Sex selection, or influencing whether to have a boy or a girl, embraces sex selection before and during pregnancy, as well as infanticide. In my presentation I will discuss the issue of sex selection from an international human rights perspective. I will address the question of whether human rights laws are permissive or prohibitive with regard to sex selection. In relation to this I will discuss some of the ethical views on the matter. India and the UK are used as case studies to illustrate the debate. In both countries sex selection is -roughly speaking- prohibited, but the difference is that, while in India there is widespread practice of ‘son preference’, in the UK reasons for choosing to sex select are mostly because of ‘family balancing’.

The key question is whether choosing the sex of one’s child is inherent in the right of reproductive choice, an important principle under international human rights law. I will suggest that international human rights law does not recognise a right to ‘sex selection’. I will point out that international human rights law is generally geared towards prohibiting sex selection based on the assumption that it enhances discrimination of women. On this basis I will put forward the view that a right to choose the sex of one’s child is not an element of women’s ‘right of reproductive choice’, which stipulates a right to choose the number and spacing of one’s children, not the sex.

Based on these findings I will argue that international human rights law provides strong legal and moral grounds for prohibiting sex selection, in particular in countries like India where there is extensive practice of sex selection. In countries like the UK, where the current main reason to sex select is for ‘family balancing’, the basis for prohibition under international human rights law is not as strong, yet several reasons can be put forward to nonetheless prohibit the practice.